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Abstract
Organizations often use non-monetary awards to incentivize performance. Awards may
aﬀect behavior through several mechanisms: by conferring employer recognition, by enhanc-
ing social visibility, and by facilitating social comparison. In a nationwide health worker
training program in Zambia, we design a ﬁeld experiment to unbundle these mechanisms.
We ﬁnd that employer recognition and social visibility increase performance while social
comparison reduces it, especially for low-ability trainees. These eﬀects appear when treat-
ments are announced and persist through training. The ﬁndings are consistent with a model
of optimal expectations in which low-ability individuals exert low eﬀort in order to avoid
information about their relative ability.
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What are the advantages which we propose by that great purpose of human
life which we call bettering our condition? To be observed, to be attended to,
to be taken notice of with sympathy, complacency, and approbation, are all
the advantages which we can propose to derive from it.
—Adam Smith, “Of the Origin of Ambition, and of the Distinction
of Ranks,” The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759)
The innate human desire for approbation might make status awards a cost-eﬀective tool
to incentivize good performance (Besley and Ghatak, 2008; Moldovanu et al., 2007). Awards
can motivate employees to exert eﬀort in order to gain recognition and visibility, both of
which are free for the employer to bestow but valuable to the employee. However, given that
awards derive their value from their scarcity, they inevitably facilitate social comparisons,
which might be demotivating to employees.2
Our goal in this paper is to “unbundle” awards—that is, to provide evidence on the
mechanisms that underlie their eﬀectiveness and potential harm. We conduct a natural
ﬁeld experiment to separately identify channels through which awards can aﬀect behavior,
unbundling the eﬀect of social comparison through the disclosure of rank information, from
the eﬀect of employer recognition and social visibility.
We study the eﬀect of awards in the context of a nationwide training program for health
workers in Zambia. Our agents are 314 health workers recruited from 162 rural communi-
ties and brought to professional school for a one-year training program aimed at teaching
community-based health care. After training, trainees will be employed by the Ministry of
Health and deployed to their communities of origin, where they will become the ﬁrst point of
contact for health services. Incentivizing learning is key in this context because trainees have
2Lazear (1989) describes the tradeoﬀ in relative performance evaluation: it could motivate employees
to work harder, but could also create an excessively competitive work environment and decrease employee
morale. Major et al. (1991)’s review of the literature in social psychology provides evidence on the demotivat-
ing eﬀect of social comparisons. A related literature in management emphasizes the importance of concealing
relative performance information to improve employee motivation (Milkovich and Newman, 1996).
2no previous medical training; thus, the skills they learn will determine their eﬀectiveness in
the ﬁeld.3
During the training program, trainees take courses on several topics, on which they are
tested at baseline (at the beginning of the year) and at the end of each course. The ﬁeld
experiment randomly allocates trainees to two broad classes of treatments (in addition to
control): those that only provide information on trainees’ relative performance, and those
that also oﬀer awards. After each exam, trainees in the control group receive a letter from the
school reporting their absolute score and their value added, measured as improvement over
their baseline score for the given course. Trainees in the “private social comparison” treatment
(T1) receive the same letter with added information on their rank in the class distribution of
both absolute score and value added. Trainees in the “public social comparison” treatment
(T2) receive the same letter as in the previous treatment as well as the names of the top
four performers in the class (top two by absolute score and top two by value added).
The third and fourth treatments add awards to rank information. Awards are given to
the trainees with the top two scores and those with the top two most improved scores (from
baseline). The latter ensures that weaker trainees have a chance to win and are therefore
motivated by the award. In the “employer recognition award” treatment (T3), the top four
performers receive a congratulatory letter from the Ministry of Health. In the “social visibility
award” treatment (T4), one of the top four performers is randomly selected to be featured in
an interview, which is printed along with the candidate’s photo in a newsletter distributed
back to their community of origin. Under a linearity assumption the diﬀerence between each
of the award treatments and the “public social comparison” treatment isolates the eﬀect of
awards from the eﬀect of the social comparisons they inevitably create.
Our setting has three key features that make it ideal for the purpose of this experiment.
First, since trainees take four courses during the study period and treatments are announced
at the beginning of the ﬁrst course, we can assess whether they change their behavior in
anticipation of receiving rank information and awards or only after these have been provided.
Second, during training, the performance of the health workers is measured by an institution
(the school) that is diﬀerent from their employer (the Ministry), and the health workers are
3A number of ﬁeld experiments have evaluated the eﬀect of ﬁnancial incentives on student learning; the
evidence of their eﬃcacy is mixed (Fryer, 2011; Angrist and Lavy, 2009; Kremer et al., 2009; Leuven et al.,
2010).
3physically removed from their home communities. This allows us to separate the eﬀect of
information on relative performance (provided by the school) from that of the employer’s
recognition and from visibility to one’s social circle (the home community). In most settings,
the employer measures and provides information on performance, such that the provision of
information necessarily entails some recognition. The fact that trainees are distant from their
communities is similarly useful, as no treatment other than the social visibility award can
be used to enhance visibility within their social circles. In most settings in which agents are
co-located with their social network, any treatment that reveals their rank in the distribution
could potentially be used to enhance visibility.
Third, performance in this setting is uni-dimensional (trainees are solely meant to attend
classes and study the topics on the syllabus), and thus not subject to a multitasking problem
in the face of additional incentives. Moreover, performance can be measured objectively and
precisely by test scores. Value added in test scores is a good measure of learning, as is often
the case when knowledge at baseline is very limited (Muralidharan and Sundararaman,
2011). Critically, we can show that in this context exam performance is correlated with
future performance in the ﬁeld (Ashraf et al., 2013b).
The analysis reveals that social comparison and awards have opposite eﬀects on perfor-
mance. Compared to trainees in the control group, the “private social comparison” treatment
signiﬁcantly reduces test scores by 0.31 standard deviations, and the “public social compari-
son” treatment reduces it by 0.38 standard deviations. Importantly, the two social compar-
ison treatments reduce performance as soon as they are announced—i.e. before trainees get
the ﬁrst letter with their rank information. A likely explanation is that individuals value the
belief that they have high relative ability, and the anticipatory utility this provides. They
may thus prefer to exert low eﬀort in order to decrease the informativeness of the ranking
signal. This is akin to refusing to take a medical test for a disease, so as to justify holding
an optimistic belief about one’s health status (Oster et al., 2013), and is consistent with the
literature on belief utility and information avoidance (Bénabou and Tirole (2002); Köszegi
(2002)). In our context, the negative eﬀect due to information avoidance seems to dominate
4the potential positive eﬀect of competition among trainees (Charness and Grosskopf, 2001;
Freeman and Gelber, 2010).4
Adding awards to rank information signiﬁcantly improves performance. Compared to
trainees in the “public social comparison” treatment, mean scores of trainees in the “employer
recognition award” and “social visibility” treatments are 0.38 and 0.44 standard deviations
higher, respectively. Recognition from one’s employer can increase performance if agents have
career concerns (Dewatripont et al., 1999) or preferences for reciprocity (Fehr and Schmidt,
1999). The net eﬀect of either type of award is nil: because the positive eﬀects of employer
recognition and social visibility are nulliﬁed by the negative eﬀect of providing information
on relative ranks, trainees in the two award treatments perform as well as trainees in control.5
Quantile treatment estimates show that both the negative eﬀect of social comparison and
the positive eﬀects of recognition and visibility are stronger on the left tail of the conditional
productivity distribution, and both are zero at the top two deciles. In line with this, we
also ﬁnd that these negative and positive eﬀects are stronger for low-ability trainees, and
zero for high-ability trainees, where ability is measured by baseline test score. The fact
that the negative eﬀect of ranking is stronger for the weakest trainees is intuitive, as these
are more likely to receive a negative signal about their skills.6 That the positive eﬀects of
recognition and visibility are also stronger for the weakest trainees may be due to the fact
that, since awards are given to trainees with the highest value added (the “most improved”),
those who start at the bottom have a better chance to win. That the eﬀects are zero for
the top two deciles is consistent with the fact that scores are capped, such that the highest
performing trainees have little room for improvement. Evidence from settings with no cap on
performance suggests that, in contrast, awards are most eﬀective at the top of the distribution
(Nalbantian and Schotter, 1997; Müller and Schotter, 2010; Bandiera et al., 2013; Leuven
et al., 2010).
4The empirical evidence on the ex-post eﬀect of providing rank information is markedly mixed. Tran
and Zeckhauser (2012), Azmat and Iriberri (2010), and Dur et al. (2013) show positive eﬀects of rank
information on performance, while Bandiera et al. (2013) and Barankay (2012) ﬁnd that this information
reduces productivity.
5This echoes the ﬁndings of Bandiera et al. (2013) who show the impact of receiving information on
relative rankings can oﬀset the positive impact of monetary prizes. In their setting, however, the eﬀect is
driven by changes in team composition.
6Tran and Zeckhauser (ibid.) ﬁnd that private rank disclosure motivates high-ability more so than low-
ability trainees, whereas Azmat and Iriberri (ibid.) ﬁnd uniformly positive eﬀects across the distribution.
5An important implication of these ﬁndings is that, due to the negative eﬀect of social
comparison, awards might increase the dispersion of performance by weakening the weakest.
In our setting, this may matter just as much as—and perhaps more than—mean eﬀects.
Health workers wield considerable power to inﬂuence the utility of their patients, especially
for the worse (e.g., missed diagnoses, incorrectly dosed medications, wrong-site amputations).
Both because of the potential for harm and the government’s mandate to ensure equity of
services across populations, the distribution of performance during training in this ﬁeld
experiment is crucial. The ﬁndings thus suggest caution in using mechanisms that facilitate
interpersonal comparisons in contexts in which worsening performance at the bottom of the
distribution is costly. This is particularly germane in the policy domains of public service
delivery, such as in health and education, where the use of awards is increasingly common
(Mathauer and Imhoﬀ, 2006; Ashraf et al., 2013a), but where distributional eﬀects on agents’
performance could have severe welfare consequences for those they are serving.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the context and the experiment.
Section 3 presents the empirical analysis. Section 4 interprets the ﬁndings in light of optimal
expectations theory (Brunnermeier and Parker, 2005; Oster et al., 2013). Section 5 concludes.
2. Experimental Design
2.1. Context
In 2010, the Government of Zambia (GOZ) launched a national eﬀort to create a new
civil service cadre called the Community Health Assistant (CHA). In the program’s ﬁrst year,
GOZ sought to recruit, train, and deploy approximately 300 Community Health Assistants
across seven of Zambia’s nine provinces.7 Within these seven provinces, based on population
density, GOZ chose the 48 most rural of the 58 constituent districts, and across these,
GOZ identiﬁed 165 underserved communities, each with an average population of 3,500
individuals (Government of Zambia, 2011). From each community, the intention was to
recruit two Community Health Assistants. The recruitment and selection process occurred
7This is the ﬁrst generation of community health workers trained by the Government of Zambia. Although
this paper does not evaluate the eﬃcacy of community health workers, they have been shown to improve
health outcomes in randomized controlled trials in other countries (Baqui et al., 2008; Bhandari et al., 2011;
Spencer et al., 2011).
6at the community level, with on-the-ground implementation coordinated by district health
oﬃcials.8
In total, 314 individuals accepted GOZ’s training oﬀer and moved to Ndola, Zambia’s
second-largest city, to join a newly established training school. The training program lasted
one year and was structured in a modular format (see Figure A.1).9 At the beginning of
the training, all trainees took a baseline exam which covered all the material that would
be subsequently taught during the training year. After each course, trainees took an exam
covering the material taught in that course.10 During this time, the trainees engaged only
in attending classes and studying for their exams. The training school was divided into ﬁve
classrooms, each accommodating roughly 60 trainees. The school was led by a principal and
staﬀed by ten full-time teachers. The trainees were not formally paid during the training
year, but their tuition and room and board were covered by the Ministry. In addition,
the participants were aware that wages upon completing training would be the same for
all CHAs, and that opportunities for promotion would be available. The program is thus
eﬀectively training “on the job” and career concerns were likely at play.
Once deployed to the ﬁeld, the CHAs were to routinely visit households and provide a
variety of home-based services: basic medical care to any sick persons, health education and
counseling, and referrals to nearby health facilities as needed. Two key features of the job
illuminate how critical the training period was to subsequent performance. First, CHAs were
expected to provide a very broad scope of health services to all age groups. Second, they
were to do so with a great deal of autonomy. In contrast to nurses, whose job it classically is
to implement a physician’s orders, and who typically are not trained to diagnose and treat
illnesses, the CHA is more like a physician, making decisions autonomously without direct
supervision. The human capital required to perform such varied activities is substantial, and
the one-year training was consequently critical.
8See Ashraf et al. (2013b) for details on the selection process of the Community Health Assistants.
9The training curriculum was designed in the months leading up to the training launch through a
consultative process led by the Zambian Ministry of Health, with input from health educators, clinicians,
and public health and development practitioners.
10Each course also had a “practical” component for which trainees visited ﬁeld sites. Performance in this
component was not tested.
72.2. Performance measurement
Since the trainees’ only task during training was to attend classes and study the material
taught therein, we measure performance by exam test scores. All exams were based on
multiple choice questions created by external medical advisors based on the content of the
oﬃcial training textbook.11 Grading was done electronically by the research team. After
each course exam, each student’s completed exam was returned to him or her, along with
an answer key.
Several measures were taken to prevent cheating or gaming. First, all exams were admin-
istered under timed, proctored conditions. Second, each exam had four versions, in which the
order of the answer choices for each question was randomly varied. The exam versions were
distributed within a classroom in sequential fashion, such that no two neighboring trainees
had the same exam version. Even if they were alike, the exam version was indicated dis-
creetly in the lower corner of the exam, such that a student attempting to cheat by copying
a neighbor’s answers would have diﬃculty determining whether the neighbor’s exam version
was the same as hers.
2.3. Experimental design
We worked with the school administrators to randomly allocate trainees to ﬁve groups
(one control and four treatments) of approximately 60 individuals each, stratiﬁed by average
baseline exam score and other potential determinants of performance.12 To minimize con-
tamination across treatments, all trainees in a given treatment group were assigned to the
same classroom, and classrooms were kept together for the entire duration of the experiment
that lasted nine consecutive months. For each course, each classroom was co-taught by two
teachers. The teachers rotated and were assigned to diﬀerent classrooms after each course,
using a schedule that was determined by the principal and by the researchers with the aim
of ensuring even coverage of teachers across classrooms. Teachers and trainees in all groups
used the same textbook that was developed by GOZ for the CHA training.
11Multiple choice questions are a standard question type on exams in Zambian secondary and tertiary
education.
12We used the “T-min-max” method to balance the classrooms on gender, baseline exam score, any
previous health experience, employment status and district-level recruitment strategy (diﬀerent districts
advertised the CHA position with diﬀerent emphases on social vs. private beneﬁts as described in Ashraf
et al. (2013b)). For a discussion of this randomization method, see Bruhn and Mckenzie (2009).
8The experimental treatments are as follows (see Figure 1 for a schematic diagram). Af-
ter each exam, trainees in the control group receive a letter from the school reporting their
absolute score and their value added over their baseline sub-score for the relevant course
content after each exam (see Appendix Figure A.2). Trainees in the “private social compari-
son” treatment (T1) receive the same letter from the school with added information on their
rank in the distribution of both absolute score and value added (see Appendix Figure A.3).
Trainees in the “public social comparison” treatment (T2) receive the same letter from the
school with added information on their rank and the names of the top four performers in the
class—that is, the top two by absolute score and the top two by value added (see Appendix
Figure A.4).13 We include the “most improved” category based on theoretical and empiri-
cal evidence that multiple prizes at diﬀerent points in the distribution are more motivating
across the distribution than a single prize (Moldovanu and Sela, 2001; Freeman and Gelber,
2010; Dur et al., 2013). Importantly, trainees did not know that they could have won “value
added” prizes when they took the baseline test, so there is no scope for gaming by obtaining
a low score at baseline.
Trainees in the “employer recognition award” treatment (T3) receive the same letter as
those in the “public social comparison” treatment, and, in addition, the top four performers
receive a congratulatory letter from the Ministry of Health, handwritten and signed by the
director of the department that runs the CHA program (see Appendix Figure A.5 for an
example). Trainees in the “social visibility award” treatment (T4) receive the same letter
as those in the “public social comparison” treatment, and, in addition, one of the top four
performers is randomly selected to be featured in an interview that is printed together with
the candidate’s photo in a newsletter that is distributed back to their community of origin
(see Appendix Figure A.6 for an example).
The timeline of the experiment is as follows. Trainees took four sequential courses during
the experimental period (covering 9.5 out of the 12 months of training) and sat exams at
the end of each course. Courses varied in duration from two weeks (course 2) to four months
(course 1). At the beginning of the ﬁrst course, trainees were told the content of the letters
13The design decision to make comparisons only at the very top public was done in consultation with
senior teachers who were concerned about severe demotivating eﬀects of publicizing the lowest performers.
Although ranking throughout the entire distribution is publicly displayed in many professional schools in
Zambia, there is no consensus on whether this is helpful or harmful.
9that they would receive after each exam, and a reminder was delivered towards the middle
of the same course. In an assessment given to all trainees after the reminder announcement,
79% of CHAs responded to the question, “How clear do you ﬁnd the information presented
in the letters?,” with “very clear” and an additional 14% with “somewhat clear.” In addition,
trainees in the two awards treatments were shown sample employer recognition letters and
community newsletters, respectively.
Table 1 shows balance across the ﬁve groups on a number of variables including baseline
exam score, English exam score, gender, age, health experience and employment status. Only
3 out of 24 (12%) pairwise diﬀerences are diﬀerent from zero at the 10% level, as expected
by chance.
During the course of the training year, 6 of 314 (1.9%) trainees dropped out of the pro-
gram. These trainees were distributed across four of the ﬁve treatment conditions (one in
the control group, one in T2, three in T3, and one in T4) and have been excluded from our
analysis. Due to the very low rate of attrition, any diﬀerences between the attrited and the
non-attrited, or between treatment conditions as a result of the attrition, are indistinguish-
able from random error.
3. Analysis
3.1. Methodology
During the experimental study period, trainees attend four courses and take an exam at
the end of each. Trainees in all treatments take the same courses and complete the same
exams at the same time.
To evaluate treatment eﬀects we estimate the following model using panel data at the
trainee-course level:
scoreic =  +
4 X
t=1
tT
t
i + Bic + Xi + Iic + "ic (1)
where scoreic is trainee i’s test score in course c normalized by the mean and standard
deviation of test scores for the same course in the control group; treatment eﬀects are thus
measured in standard deviation units. Bic is trainee i’s score in the baseline exam content for
course c that was administered at the start of the training program. The diﬀerence between
the “post” exam score and the baseline score is used to measure the value added that is
10reported in the treatment letters and to rank trainees for the “most improved” awards. Xi
are individual characteristics that include all stratiﬁcation variables as well as age and trainee
i’s test score for an English language test. Iic are teacher-speciﬁc traits such as teacher ratings
(as reported anonymously by the trainees) and expertise in the subject matter of course c:
Since all trainees take the same courses at the same time, diﬀerent trainees have diﬀerent
teachers for the same course. The teacher rotation schedule was determined by the principal
and by the researchers with the aim of ensuring even coverage of teachers across classes.
Standard errors are clustered at the trainee level, as trainee-speciﬁc unobservables in
the error term create correlation within trainee. Since courses are of diﬀerent durations
and trainees have more time to exert learning eﬀort the longer the course is, we weight
observations by course duration.
The parameters t measure the causal eﬀect of treatment t vis-à-vis the control group
under the identifying assumption of no contamination across treatments. Contamination can
occur if the response to treatment j is aﬀected by the knowledge that treatment k exists. For
instance, trainees might respond diﬀerently to being given information on relative rankings
if they know that other trainees are also getting employer recognition awards while they
are not. To minimize the risk of contamination, we allocate trainees in diﬀerent treatments
to diﬀerent classes and keep classes together for the duration of the experiment. Trainees
were told that other classrooms may receive diﬀerent types of letters with their their exam
scores, as this was the pilot year of the government program and diﬀerent classrooms were
trying diﬀerent things. Trainees were not told that this was a research experiment, thus
mitigating potential experimenter demand eﬀects. Reassuringly, no student ever complained
or raised the issue of diﬀerent treatments for the entire duration of the experiment. Despite
these precautions, trainees in the non-award treatments could have come across the award
recognition letter and community newsletter given to trainees in other treatments. This,
however, could have occurred only after the awards were distributed—that is, after the ﬁrst
test. To provide evidence on the practical relevance of contamination, we estimate equation
(1) using scores from the ﬁrst exam only, which was taken before trainees could have seen
letters given to their colleagues in other treatments.
To separate the diﬀerent mechanisms through which awards can aﬀect performance, treat-
ments are designed to be cumulative so that the “public social comparisons” treatment (T2)
also contains information about relative ranks (T1), and the two awards treatments (T3
11and T4) contain the same information as T2. Under the assumption that the eﬀect of each
component does not interact with the eﬀect of the others, the net eﬀect of each additional
component can be identiﬁed by the appropriate linear combination of t estimators. For
instance, the net eﬀect of employer recognition is given by 3   2. We report all relevant
linear combinations at the foot of each table.
3.2. Average treatment eﬀects
Table 2 reports the estimates of equation (1). Test scores are normalized by the mean and
standard deviation of the control group for each test so that treatment eﬀects are measured
in standard deviation units. Columns (1) and (2) estimate average treatment eﬀects with
and without teacher characteristics (average teacher rating and whether at least one of the
teachers had speciﬁc expertise in the subject matter).
Three ﬁndings are of note. First, trainees in treatments 1 (private social comparison)
and 2 (public social comparison) perform signiﬁcantly worse than trainees in the control
group. Estimates from the baseline speciﬁcation in Column (1) show that giving private
information about relative rankings lowers performance by 0.31 standard deviations, while
rank information combined with a public list of the top four performers lowers performance by
0.38 standard deviations. By contrast, trainees in treatments 3 and 4, where top performers
receive awards either in the form of a letter from the Ministry of Health or a proﬁle in the
organization’s newsletter, performed the same as trainees in the control group.
Importantly, since trainees can do very little other than studying during the program,
we can rule out that the drop in exam performance is associated with an increase of eﬀort
devoted to other tasks. In addition, in Ashraf et al. (2013b) we ﬁnd that low performance
on test scores during training is highly predictive of low performance in the ﬁeld in CHA
work. This strongly suggests that, even if there were other tasks, there is no compensating
eﬀort, either on other tasks during training or in later job performance that can make up
for negative performance during the training period.
Second, we can identify the net eﬀect of each additional treatment component by dif-
ferencing out common elements under the independence assumption discussed above. This
exercise reveals that the diﬀerence between T2 and T1 is small and not statistically signiﬁ-
cant, suggesting that making the list of top performers public does not motivate individuals
to work harder. This might be driven by the possibility that other trainees are not the nat-
ural peer group to whom these individuals compare themselves. Alternatively, given that in
12T1, individual ranks were printed on a letter, top performers in T1 could have easily made
themselves known even if the list was not public.
Similarly, we can identify the eﬀect of employer recognition and social visibility by diﬀer-
encing out the eﬀect of providing rank information. Column (1) of Table 2 shows that both
mechanisms have a strong positive eﬀect on performance. The diﬀerence between T3 and
T2 is 0.38 standard deviations, whereas the diﬀerence between T4 and T2 is 0.44 standard
deviations. Both eﬀects are precisely estimated.
Third, the estimated treatment eﬀects are not sensitive to the inclusion of teacher controls
(i.e., average teacher rating in students’ evaluations and whether at least one of the teachers
had speciﬁc expertise in the subject matter). This allays the concern that diﬀerences among
treatments could be due to correlated unobservables at the class-course level. Since including
teacher controls reduces the sample as these were not collected for course 2, we use the
speciﬁcation without teacher controls in what follows.
Taken together, the ﬁndings indicate that the three mechanisms described at the outset
of this paper are relevant in this setting, but their signs and magnitudes diﬀer: social com-
parisons (whether private or public) weaken motivation whereas employer recognition and
social visibility strengthen it.14 Thus, depending on the size of these opposing eﬀects in a
given context, the net eﬀect of relative performance-based awards is uncertain.
3.3. Timing
Since treatments are announced at the beginning of course 1, we are able to identify
whether their eﬀect diﬀers before and after the ﬁrst round of letters containing rank infor-
mation and awards are handed out. This test can help us shed light on why individuals
change their behavior in response to rank information. For instance, if individuals are un-
certain about the production function of test scores and use rank information to update on
the marginal return of their eﬀort, we would expect them to respond diﬀerentially before and
after the information is provided. In contrast, if individuals know the production function
and intrinsically care about their performance rank, we would expect their responses to be
the same before and after.
14It could be argued that social visibility (in our case, visibility in one’s home community) is a more
powerful motivator in this setting; indeed, while the estimated eﬀects are similar, the underlying treatment
strength is diﬀerent, as all top four performers receive the employer recognition award, whereas only one of
them is randomly selected for the social visibility award.
13To test whether responses vary before and after rank information is ﬁrst disclosed, we
estimate equation (1) augmented by the interactions of all treatment indicators with an
indicator variable that takes value 0 for the ﬁrst test (i.e., before treatment letters were
distributed) and 1 for the following tests. Columns (3) and (4) of Table 2 report the estimated
treatment eﬀects on performance in the ﬁrst test and performance in the following tests,
respectively. Column (5) reports the p-value of the null hypothesis that these are equal.
The ﬁndings show that social comparisons, whether private or public, lead to a similar
reduction in performance in the ﬁrst and subsequent tests. Thus, this eﬀect cannot be driven
by “demotivation” in the traditional sense, or updating on the marginal return to eﬀort,
since trainees’ performance dropped in anticipation of receiving rank information. Likewise,
the ﬁndings are at odds with the assumption that trainees have competitive preferences
(Charness and Grosskopf, 2001; Freeman and Gelber, 2010); otherwise, we should have
observed an increase in eﬀort in anticipation of receiving rank information. In Section 4,
we describe a model of optimal expectations that is consistent with this pattern, in which
trainees choose low eﬀort (i.e., self-sabotage) to avoid rank information that delivers a signal
about their relative ability.
In addition, columns (3) and (4) cast doubt on the relevance of the concern that responses
to treatments 1 and 2 might be contaminated by the awareness of the other two treatments.
Indeed, we show that providing rank information with or without a public list of top per-
formers reduces performance by the same amount even before trainees in these treatments
were likely to have become aware of the other treatments.15
The ﬁndings also show that both the employer recognition award and the social visibility
award are eﬀective at increasing performance conditional on rank information both before
and after the ﬁrst exam. The eﬀect of the recognition award becomes weaker after the ﬁrst
exam, possibly because individuals revise their chance of winning downwards once the ﬁrst
round of rank information is revealed. We do not, however, ﬁnd a similar pattern with
respect to the social visibility award. We will return to this below when we allow responses
to diﬀer by baseline ability levels.
15It was of course possible for trainees in the award treatments to tell their colleagues in other treatments
before the ﬁrst exam, and before the awards were distributed. However, these claims should have been more
credible and hence contamination stronger after the awards letters became potentially visible to all. The
fact that treatment eﬀects are stable throughout courses casts doubt on this.
143.4. Distributional eﬀects
Awards are likely to aﬀect individuals at diﬀerent points in the performance distribution
diﬀerently, as the incentive power of awards should be stronger for those who have a greater
chance of winning the award—in our case, more able trainees and those who have more
potential to improve. Similarly, the eﬀect of social comparison is likely to depend on whether,
given their knowledge of their own ability and expectation about others’, individuals expect
to be ranked high or low.
To provide evidence on these distributional issues we estimate quantile treatment eﬀects
at each decile. Figure 2 shows this graphically, and Appendix Table A.1 reports the regression
coeﬃcients by decile. The estimated treatment eﬀect at each decile is the diﬀerence in
conditional test score between two statistical trainees—one in the treatment group and one
in the control group—both positioned at the same decile of the distribution of test scores
within her group. Figure 2 shows that both the negative eﬀect of relative rankings and the
positive eﬀects of recognition and visibility are stronger on the left tail of the conditional
test score distribution, and they gradually diminish to zero at the top two deciles. Standard
errors reported in Appendix Table A.1 show that all eﬀects are statistically diﬀerent from
zero until the seventh decile. Taken together, these ﬁndings indicate that information on
relative ranks, with or without a public component, increases the dispersion of performance
by reducing performance on the left tail.
To provide further evidence on this issue, Table 3 allows treatments to have heterogeneous
eﬀects by trainees’ ability, measured by their score in the baseline exam. The estimates show
that both the negative eﬀect of relative rankings and the positive eﬀects of recognition and
visibility are stronger for low-ability trainees and zero for high-ability trainees. The fact
that the negative eﬀect of relative rankings is stronger for the weakest trainees is intuitive,
as these are more likely to receive a negative signal about their skills. That the positive
eﬀects of recognition and visibility are also stronger for the weakest trainees is presumably
due to the fact that, since awards are given to trainees with the highest value added (the
“most improved”), those who start at the bottom have a better chance to win. That the
15eﬀects are zero for the top two deciles is consistent with the fact that scores are capped, such
that the very best trainees have little room for improvement.16
Finally, Appendix Table A.2 allows treatments to have heterogeneous eﬀects by trainees’
ability and exam timing. This conﬁrms that most eﬀects are driven by trainees at the bottom
of the ability distribution and that, as discussed above, rank information leads to a similar
reduction in performance in the ﬁrst and subsequent tests. The results also show some
evidence that the positive eﬀect of awards becomes weaker after the ﬁrst exam for trainees
in the bottom tercile while it becomes stronger for those in the middle tercile. These ﬁndings
should, however, be taken with caution as samples are small and tests have low power.
4. Interpretation
Our results suggest that the prospect of receiving information about one’s rank in the
distribution makes trainees exert lower eﬀort, whereas the possibility of receiving employer
recognition or improving one’s visibility in the community makes them exert higher eﬀort.
In this section, we attempt to interpret these ﬁndings in a uniﬁed utility maximization
framework.
The fact that individuals put in more eﬀort when it is announced that doing so might earn
them an award is intuitive. The main challenge is to explain why individuals, especially those
with low ability, reduce eﬀort in the rank information treatments even before being told their
rank. A growing literature models the possibility that information lowers utility leading to
information avoidance, at the cost of taking worse decisions (Oster et al., 2013; Brunnermeier
and Parker, 2005; Köszegi, 2006; Stone, 2004). In these models, agents choose their beliefs
optimally to maximize their lifetime utility, including an interim period of anticipatory utility
arising from the belief. This implies that individuals may take actions to avoid a precise
signal that has the potential to threaten their belief, for instance by choosing not to take a
medical test.
16Across the entire sample, mean absolute post-test score in the highest decile is 90.0% and in the second-
highest decile is 86.5%. The single highest absolute score across all exams was 96.1%. As our team, in
consultation with medical training experts, wrote the exams to ensure quality and precision, we purposely
included extremely diﬃcult questions making scores of 100% very diﬃcult. We thus take the evidence on
top decile scores as support for the existence of capping, although we cannot rule out the possibility that
other eﬀects (such as a lack of desire to be singled out among peers, due to being taxed by expectations of
assistance) may have also been occurring at the top decile.
16In our setting, all agents know their individual baseline test scores and are told their
individual exam scores in all treatment groups (including control). This, combined with the
fact that individuals have a relatively good sense of their own individual ability since they
all enter as adults, allows us to assume all that all individuals know their own ability. What
individuals do not know is the ability of others—a reasonable assumption in our setting
given that trainees entered the training school from an extremely diverse set of geographic
and skill backgrounds. Realistically, individuals have a noisy expectation over their peers’
ability.
In this setting, rank information (as provided in all treatment groups but not in control)
increases the precision of the estimate of each individual’s expectation over his peers’ average
ability. This would not aﬀect behavior in standard models where agents only care about
the expected value, but it might matter if agents prefer a fuzzy signal which can support
optimistic beliefs about their relative ability.
We assume that agents are risk-neutral, and individual i with ability level ai chooses
eﬀort ei to maximize his expected utility:

t
it(ai;ei) + 
sc
i (ai   a

 i)(1 + T
sc
i (ei)) + 
a
i T
A
i p(ai;ei;bi)A   d(ei) (2)
The ﬁrst term captures the eﬀect of eﬀort on learning proxied by test scores, which
might provide utility either directly as individuals care about learning or through future
wages. t
i > 0 is the weight individual i puts on learning, and learning is a function of eﬀort
and ability with te > 0;ta > 0, tee < 0. We assume that individuals know their own ability,
as, again, individuals know their baseline scores and their absolute test scores in control and
treatment alike.
The second term captures the utility deriving from social comparisons to which individual
i gives weight sc
i > 0. Social comparisons enter additively as in Kandel and Lazear (1992),
and we assume that individuals care about being of higher ability than their peers rather
than having higher test scores per se. We assume that individuals enjoy social comparisons
when their own ability is higher than the average of their peers a
 i, and the eﬀect is larger
the larger is the ability gap. Conversely, individuals suﬀer from social comparisons when
their own ability is lower than the average of their peers, and the eﬀect is larger the larger
is the ability gap.
17Finally, as discussed above, we assume that when individuals are given information on
test score ranks, they can obtain more precise information about their relative ability. Thus,
T sc
i = 1 if individual i is in one of the four treatment groups that provide rank information
on test scores and 0 in control. In particular, we assume that whether test score ranks give
information on ability ranks depends positively on eﬀort through the “signal” function (ei)
with e > 0. Intuitively, since test scores are a function of ability and eﬀort, receiving a low
rank when exerting low eﬀort could still allow an individual to retain the option of believing
that he is of truly high relative ability, but receiving a low rank with high eﬀort could not.17
The “signal” function (ei) is a reduced form representation of “choosing beliefs” in the spirit
of Yariv (2002), Köszegi (2006), Oster et al. (2013) and Brunnermeier and Parker (2005).18
The third term captures the utility deriving from award A; which in our setting is either
employer recognition or social visibility. Thus, T A
i = 1 if individual i is in one of the two
treatment groups that provide awards, and 0 otherwise. Note that T A
i = 1 ) T SC
i = 1 but
not vice versa. The probability of winning the award p(ai;ei;bi) depends on eﬀort, ability,
and the baseline score bi, with pe > 0, pee < 0;pa > 0, and pb < 0. The latter captures that
“most improved” awards are more easily obtainable by those who did poorly in the baseline
test.
Finally, d(e) is the disutility of eﬀort, with de > 0; dee > 0 as is standard.
Maximizing equation (2) with respect to ei yields:
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17This holds regardless of whether i expects others to exert high or low eﬀort. If he chooses high eﬀort
and expects others to do so as well, a low rank in test scores implies a low rank in ability. If he expects
others to choose low eﬀort, a low rank in test scores implies a low rank in ability a fortiori.
18Similarly, Benabou and Tirole (2002) consider a model where agents can manipulate their interim
belief through the choice of information structure. They show that less information can be preferable as
it can weaken the time inconsistency problem and induce more eﬀort in the future. We do not assume
time inconsistency in our setting, which would exacerbate our eﬀect as it would further discount the future
impacts of taking distorted actions for interim belief utility.
18The ﬁrst order conditions for eﬀort in the three cases inform the comparison of perfor-
mance in each treatment vs. the control group and across treatments. These comparisons
map into the empirical ﬁndings as follows.
First, eC
i > eSC
i iﬀ ai < a
 i; namely, providing rank information reduces eﬀort for individ-
uals whose ability is lower than their expectation of their peers’ ability. Intuitively, all other
things equal, eﬀort provides them with something undesirable (a precise private signal of
their ranking in the class). This is related to the psychology literature on “self-handicapping,”
which can take the form of withdrawing eﬀort in performance settings where there is po-
tential for self-image-damaging feedback (Jones and Berglas, 1978; Berglas, 1985).19 In line
with this, a qualitative survey we administered before implementing the treatments reveals
that 43% of the trainees in the bottom quartile of baseline scores did not want to know their
relative rank in the class, while only 24% of those in the top quartile said the same.
These ﬁndings are similar to the behavioral model in Oster et al. (2013), in which people
at risk for Huntington’s disease prefer not to be undergo a test to learn whether they have
the genetic mutation that causes the disease because the anticipatory utility of believing
they might not get sick outweighs the costs of potentially distorted actions.
Second eA
i > eSC
i for all i; namely, providing awards in addition to rank information can
only increase eﬀort as long as awards are valuable, since a
i pe(ai;eA
i ;bi)A > 0. The strength
of the eﬀect depends on ability and baseline scores, both of which determine the marginal
return to eﬀort pe(ai;eA
i;bi):
Third, eA
i > eC
i for all i such that ai  a
 i, as both the second (rank information)
and third (award) term in the ﬁrst order condition are weakly positive, thus increasing the
marginal return to eﬀort. In contrast, eA
i S eC
i for all i such that ai < a
 i since the second
(rank information) term is negative and the third (award) term is positive. Thus, providing
awards might reduce eﬀort compared to the control group that receives no awards or rank
information if the response to rank information is stronger than the response to the award
itself.
19This allows the trainee to manipulate the attribution of failure to himself (Kelley, 1971). If failure
occurs, the extent to which the outcome is attributed to his lack of ability is discounted because of the
equally likely reason for failure: decreased eﬀort. However, if the trainee obtains a high grade on the exam,
the attribution to ability is strengthened because the decreased learning eﬀort made it even more diﬃcult
to do well.
195. Conclusion
Our results suggest that awards can have a negative eﬀect on performance as they facili-
tate social comparison, even though they have a positive eﬀect through employer recognition
and enhanced social visibility. In our context, the negative eﬀect of rank information on
learning was large enough to undo the positive eﬀects of awards. Since learning is directly
related to future labor productivity, and test scores are signiﬁcantly predictive of future per-
formance, the distortion in eﬀort is practically signiﬁcant, and detrimental to the objective
of increasing overall learning and later on-the-job productivity.
While the relative magnitudes of these eﬀects are likely to be context-speciﬁc, the possible
negative eﬀects of rank information and social comparisons are important to consider in
the overall productivity eﬀects and design of performance awards. In particular, we show
that individuals may even reduce eﬀort in anticipation of learning rank information. This
is consistent with a model in which individuals have preferences over their self-perceived
ability ranking, and thus engage in information avoidance to be able to retain a positive
view of themselves. In eﬀect, in this model, agents self-sabotage in order to avoid the signal
contained in ranking information so as not to have to update their beliefs about their own
relative ability. As the risk of a low-rank signal is greater in lower ability ranges, this self-
handicapping is worse at the bottom of the distribution.
From an employer or policy maker perspective, the cost of an incentive structure that
diﬀerentially aﬀects the lower tail depends on the nature of the production function. It is
particularly costly when there are complementarities in production or when the performance
of the lower tail is critical to the principal’s goal, as in our setting where the government
wants to ensure equitable provision of health services to remote rural areas. In domains
such as innovation in science and ﬁnance, the eﬀect on productivity of the upper tail of the
distribution might be most important. But in domains such as health services delivery where
the potential for harm is high, it is critical to employ incentives that are not detrimental to
the lower tail of the distribution. This depends in part, as well, on the ease of exit and entry;
if the goal is to induce the lower tail to withdraw eﬀort, and potentially exit, then providing
rank information could be a highly eﬀective means to do so. It is left to future research to
unbundle these eﬀects across cultures and professional sectors.
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23Figure 1: Schematic of Experimental Treatment Conditions.
After each course 
exam, each trainee 
is given a private 
letter that 
indicates his or 
her absolute 
score on the exam 
as well as his or 
her value added 
with respect to his 
or her course sub-
score in the 
baseline exam.
The letter reports 
the trainee’s rank 
within the 
classroom on 
absolute score and 
value added, 
respectively.
The two trainees 
with the highest 
exam score and 
the two trainees 
with the highest 
value added are 
publicly named 
in the letters 
given to all 
trainees within the 
classroom.
The four top-
performing 
trainees are given 
a personalized 
letter from the 
program director 
at the Ministry of 
Health 
congratulating 
them on their 
achievement.
One of the four 
top-performing 
trainees is 
randomly chosen 
to be profiled in a 
newsletter that is 
sent to all of the 
trainees' 
communities of 
origin.
C:
Control ✔
T1:
Private Social Comparison ✔ ✔
T2:
T1 + Public Social Comparison ✔ ✔ ✔
T3:
T2 + Employer Recognition Award ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
T4:
T2 + Social Visibility Award ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
Components
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25Table 2: Average Treatment Eﬀects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Baseline
Teacher 
controls
First exam
Following 
exams
T1: Private Social Comparison -0.308* -0.351** -0.287* -0.322*
(0.161) (0.171) (0.168) (0.194)
T2: T1 + Public Social Comparison -0.379*** -0.409*** -0.456*** -0.324**
(0.145) (0.155) (0.172) (0.156)
T3: T2 + Employer Recognition Award 0.005 -0.044 0.128 -0.080
(0.133) (0.174) (0.165) (0.136)
T4: T2 + Social Visibility Award 0.064 0.122 -0.140 0.112
(0.135) (0.148) (0.165) (0.143)
Net effect of Public Social Comparison (T2-T1) -0.071 -0.058 -0.170 -0.003
(0.166) (0.164)  (0.174) (0.201)
Net effect of Employer Recognition Award (T3-T2) 0.384***  0.365**  0.585*** 0.244*
(0.141) (0.161) (0.175) (0.148)
Net effect of Social Visibility Award (T4-T2) 0 .443*** 0.531*** 0.316* 0.436***
(0.141) (0.151) (0.170) (0.153)
Trainee controls yes yes
Teacher controls no yes
Number of clusters (trainees) 307 307
Number of observations (trainee-courses) 1149 850
Adjusted R-squared 0.213 0.212
307
1149
0.224
p =
p =
p =
p =
p =
0.026
0.458
Notes: Table reports OLS estimates, weighted by course duration, with standard errors clustered at the trainee level in parentheses.
Dependent variable is normalized exam score, normalized by the mean and standard deviation of the control group for each exam.
Trainee controls include: score in the baseline test for each of the four courses, English test score, gender, age, previous experience in
the health sector, employment status at the time of application, district recruitment strategy. Teacher controls include: average teacher
rating and whether at least one of the teachers had specific expertise in the subject matter. Both variables are defined at the course-
treatment level. Columns (2) and (3) report coefficients estimated in the same regression where we include all treatments interacted
with an indicator variable that takes value 0 in the first period and 1 thereafter.
  *** Significant at the 1 percent level.
    ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
      * Significant at the 10 percent level.
Heterogeneous effects by exam period
Test of 
equality
(5)
p =
p =
yes
no
0.844
0.378
0.123
0.087
0.381
26Table 3: Heterogeneous Treatment Eﬀects by Baseline Test Score
(1) (2) (3)
First tercile of 
baseline test score
Second tercile of 
baseline test score
Third tercile of 
baseline test score
T1: Private Social Comparison -0.672** -0.233 0.010
(0.298) (0.271) (0.213)
T2: T1 + Public Social Comparison -0.812*** -0.179 -0.113
(0.260) (0.199) (0.203)
T3: T2+ Employer Recognition Award -0.280 0.157 -0.005
(0.216) (0.250) (0.159)
T4: T2+Social Visibility Award -0.102 0.204 -0.031
(0.309) (0.223) (0.177)
Net effect of Public Social Comparison (T2-T1) -0.140  0.054 -0.153 
(0.334) (0.243)  (0.214) 
Net effect of Employer Recognition Award (T3-T2) 0.532**  0.336   0.107
(0.255) (0.214) (0.166) 
Net effect of Social Visibility Award (T4-T2) 0 .710** 0.383**  0.082
(0.342) (0.183) (0.173)
Trainee controls yes yes yes
Number of clusters (trainees) 92 107 107
Number of observations (trainee-courses) 350 401 398
Adjusted R-squared 0.186 0.079 0.157
Notes: Table reports OLS estimates, weighted by course duration, with standard errors clustered at the trainee level in parentheses.
Dependent variable is normalized exam score, normalized by the mean and standard deviation of the control group for each exam.
Individual controls include: score in the baseline test for each of the four courses, English test score, gender, age, previous experience
in the health sector, employment status at the time of application, district recruitment strategy.
  *** Significant at the 1 percent level.
    ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
      * Significant at the 10 percent level.
27Figure 2: Quantile Treatment Eﬀects
Notes: Each line connects treatment effects of each treatment estimated at each decile. Point estimates and standard errors are reported in Table A1.
Individual controls include: score in the baseline test for each of the four courses, English test score, gender, age, previous experience in the health
sector, employment status at the time of application, district recruitment strategy. 
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28Appendix
Figure A.1: Outline of One-year Community Health Assistant Training Curriculum
Course  Module  Teaching 
Days  Topics 
0  1: Health care 
system in Zambia 
4  •  Organization and functions of the health care system in Zambia 
•  Roles and responsibilities of a Community Health Assistant 
•  Code of conduct 
•  Gender equality 
•  Community mobilization and networking 
  2: Behavioral 
sciences 
19  •  Introduction to psychology 
•  Mental health and common psychiatric conditions 
•  Introduction to sociology 
•  Family and community 
  3: Health 
promotion 
9  •  Introduction to health promotion 
•  Communication skills 
  4: Environmental 
health  
31  •  General principles of infection prevention 
•  Water supply 
•  Excreta disposal 
•  Solid waste management 
•  Food hygiene and safety 
•  Housing and health 
•  Insect and rodent control 
1  5: Epidemiology  34  •  Infectious disease epidemiology 
•  Epidemic investigation and management 
•  Epidemiological surveillance 
•  Data collection 
  6: Reproductive 
and child health 
35  •  Introduction to reproductive health 
•  Introduction to child health 
•  School health services 
2  7: Anatomy and 
physiology 
20  •  Introduction to the human body 
•  Musculoskeletal system 
•  Cardiovascular system 
•  Respiratory system 
•  Digestive system 
•  Urinary system 
•  Special senses 
3  8: Basic 
procedures 
20  •  Occupational safety and health 
•  Lifting and moving patients 
•  History and physical exam skills 
•  Assessment of hygiene, nutrition, physical activity, pain, and vital 
signs 
•  Wound care 
•  Palliative care 
  9: Common 
medical 
conditions 
38  •  Common conditions (malaria, diarrhea, respiratory infection, HIV, 
tuberculosis, anemia, etc.) 
•  Oral health 
4  10: Diagnostic 
procedures 
4  •  Malaria rapid diagnostic testing 
•  HIV testing 
•  Sputum collection for TN testing 
  11: First aid  9  •  Principles of first aid 
•  Bandaging 
•  Lifting and moving patients 
•  Cardio-pulmonary resuscitation 
•  Handling of selected emergencies (toxic ingestion, bites and stings, 
fractures, burns, drowning, foreign body ingestion) 
 
29Figure A.2: Control Group
 
 
 
Ndola 18
th July 2011   
 
 
Dear Martha Banda, 
 
 
Please find below your scores on the Module 4 exam: 
   Theoretical: 76% 
   Improvement from baseline exam: 20% points improvement (76%-56% 
on baseline exam) 
 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
Mrs Nyirenda  
Training coordinator   
 
 
 
NDOLA COMMUNITY HEALTH 
ASSISTANT TRAINING SCHOOL 
Figure A.3: Treatment #1
 
 
 
Ndola 18
th July 2011   
 
 
Dear Martha Banda, 
 
 
Please find below your scores on the Module 4 exam: 
   Theoretical: 76% 
   Improvement from baseline exam: 20% points improvement (76%-56% 
on baseline exam) 
 
 
 
Within your class you were: 
   1
st out of 60 students on the Theoretical. 
   13
th out of 60 students in terms of most improved from the 
baseline exam.  
 
 
 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
Mrs Nyirenda  
Training coordinator   
 
 
 
NDOLA COMMUNITY HEALTH 
ASSISTANT TRAINING SCHOOL 
All names are ﬁctional.
30Figure A.4: Treatment #2
 
 
 
Ndola 18
th July 2011   
 
 
Dear Martha Banda, 
 
 
Please find below your scores on the Module 4 exam: 
   Theoretical: 76% 
   Improvement from baseline exam: 20% points improvement (76%-56% 
on baseline exam) 
 
 
 
Within your class you were: 
   1
st out of 60 students on the Theoretical. 
   13
th out of 60 students in terms of most improved from the 
baseline exam.  
 
 
 
Please note the following top performers: 
 
   Martha Banda was 1
st in this class on Theoretical score. 
   James Mwanza was 2
nd in this class on Theoretical score. 
   Peter Mwaba was 1
st in this class on most improved from the 
baseline exam. 
   Martha Chilima was 2
nd in this class on most improved from the 
baseline exam. 
 
 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
Mrs Nyirenda  
Training coordinator   
 
 
 
NDOLA COMMUNITY HEALTH 
ASSISTANT TRAINING SCHOOL 
31Figure A.5: Treatment #3
 
 
 
Ndola 18
th July 2011   
 
 
Dear Martha Banda, 
 
 
Please find below your scores on the Module 4 exam: 
   Theoretical: 76% 
   Improvement from baseline exam: 20% points improvement (76%-56% 
on baseline exam) 
 
 
 
Within your class you were: 
   1
st out of 60 students on the Theoretical. 
   13
th out of 60 students in terms of most improved from the 
baseline exam.  
 
 
 
Please note the following top performers: 
 
   Martha Banda was 1
st in this class on Theoretical score. 
   James Mwanza was 2
nd in this class on Theoretical score. 
   Peter Mwaba was 1
st in this class on most improved from the 
baseline exam. 
   Martha Chilima was 2
nd in this class on most improved from the 
baseline exam. 
 
 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
Mrs Nyirenda  
Training coordinator   
 
 
 
NDOLA COMMUNITY HEALTH 
ASSISTANT TRAINING SCHOOL 
Top	 ﾠperformers	 ﾠalso	 ﾠreceive	 ﾠ
le er	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠMoH	 ﾠ
32Figure A.6: Treatment #4
 
 
 
Ndola 18
th July 2011   
 
 
Dear Martha Banda, 
 
 
Please find below your scores on the Module 4 exam: 
   Theoretical: 76% 
   Improvement from baseline exam: 20% points improvement (76%-56% 
on baseline exam) 
 
 
 
Within your class you were: 
   1
st out of 60 students on the Theoretical. 
   13
th out of 60 students in terms of most improved from the 
baseline exam.  
 
 
 
Please note the following top performers: 
 
   Martha Banda was 1
st in this class on Theoretical score. 
   James Mwanza was 2
nd in this class on Theoretical score. 
   Peter Mwaba was 1
st in this class on most improved from the 
baseline exam. 
   Martha Chilima was 2
nd in this class on most improved from the 
baseline exam. 
 
 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
Mrs Nyirenda  
Training coordinator   
 
 
 
NDOLA COMMUNITY HEALTH 
ASSISTANT TRAINING SCHOOL 
One	 ﾠof	 ﾠtop	 ﾠperformers	 ﾠalso	 ﾠ
featured	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠnewsle er	 ﾠsent	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠcommunity	 ﾠ
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